Tag Archives: Chudhry

Dangerous duffers: ISI’s interface with terror – by Khaled Ahmed

ISI’s interface with terror

By Khaled Ahmed

On July 12, 2012, ex-ISI chief General (retd) Asad Durrani appeared on PTV and expressed his views in his characteristic reductive manner. Durrani cultivates gruffness as his trademark. In this, he is like a predecessor of his, General Mahmood Ahmad: the US is here in the region to stay to get to the oil and gas bonanza of Central Asia; and Pakistan has to deal with this as a threat to its security.

While Durrani delivered his rough wisdom, another retired spy boss, Hamid Gul, was in the Long March of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council, riding in an ego-boosting Land Cruiser, seeing cash worth lakhs of rupees being handed around on the way.

Hamid Gul has told the international press that he had sent his sons to be trained with the Haqqanis in the tribal areas. Barnett R Rubin in his book The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (Yale University Press, 1995) wrote that, in 1988-89, the 519-strong Afghan shura in Peshawar received 25,000 dollars per member as bribe from the Saudi intelligence agency, which spent 26 million dollars per week during the Peshawar session. The ‘deal’ was facilitated, according to Rubin, by Hamid Gul.

That year, Afghanistan’s ruler, President Najibullah, defeated the ISI-nurtured mujahideen in Jalalabad. Hamid Gul says he did not plan the Jalalabad operation, but an ISI officer, Brigadier S A Tirmizi, in his book Profiles of Intelligence (1997) stated that he had.

Like Durrani, Hamid Gul has been frequently clueless but speaks like a prophet on Pakistan’s security. He thought Aimal Kasi, who was executed for killing CIA agents in the US, was called a CIA agent by him. He had to admit that his plan to put together the IJI in 1990 to prevent the PPP from coming to power was wrong.

Our ISI geniuses were not only clueless; what is worse, they were usually ‘reverse-indoctrinated’. Hamid Gul never believed that Osama bin Laden had done 9/11; he was convinced that the Jews had done it.

Another ISI chief, General Mahmood Ahmad, was simply cowed by the charisma of Mullah Umar. Cathy Gannon in her book ‘I’ is for Infidel: from Holy War to Holy Terror, 18 Years inside Afghanistan (Public Affairs, 2005) tells the story. ISI boss Mahmood Ahmad was in Washington when Osama struck on 9/11. General Musharraf sent him to Mullah Umar to tell him to avoid being invaded by the US and surrender Osama.

Continue reading Dangerous duffers: ISI’s interface with terror – by Khaled Ahmed

Justice served

By Saad Hafiz

Excerpt;

…. It is probably an understatement to suggest that past SC judgments have not helped the cause of democracy and the rule of law in the country. The following examples come to mind. In 1954, the otherwise brilliant Chief Justice Munir invoked the ‘doctrine of necessity’, validating the dissolution of Pakistan’s first constituent assembly, which many feel set the precedent for future authoritarian intervention the country. To his credit, Justice Munir also wrote a thought-provoking book, From Jinnah to Zia, arguing that Mr. Jinnah stood for a tolerant and secular state where Muslims and non-Muslims had equal rights.

Later, Chief Justice CJ Anwarul Haq is ‘ill-famed’ for giving gave legitimacy to General Zia’s martial law and for upholding the decision of the Lahore High Court, which sentenced Mr ZA Bhutto to death for conspiring in the murder of a political opponent. Ironically, unlike incumbent Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Justice Anwarul Haq became the first Justice and perhaps only chief justice to refuse taking the oath under the military imposed PCO and resigned on conscientious grounds in 1981.

Beyond the cases of the ‘disappeared’, the security establishment has always escaped accountability for causing great harm to country by fighting and losing needless wars, pursuing flawed national security policies and more recently for their incompetence in the bin Laden and Mehran episodes. It is not unreasonable to hope that the SC will show an even handed approach in dealing with an elected government and other powerful institutions like the armed forces who are in effect a law unto themselves.

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Former CIA officer: Sharif begged our help against military in 1999. Why is he crying now?

Memo crisis adds pressure to US ties

By Reuters

Excerpt;

WASHINGTON: A political crisis in Pakistan may threaten not only the future of President Asif Ali Zardari but also keep pressure on an already tense relationship with the United States as it seeks to stabilise neighbouring Afghanistan.

A scandal over a murky memo that warned the Pentagon of a possible military coup in Pakistan has highlighted historic tensions between the weak civilian government in Islamabad and the powerful military, whose help Washington needs to battle militants fueling violence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court began hearings this week into who was behind the memo, keeping the spotlight on a controversy that has added even more strain to US-Pakistan relations. ….

…. QUESTIONS ABOUT PAKISTANI MOTIVES

There are also doubts in Washington about how much turbulence Pakistan’s fragile democracy can withstand and whether courts can conduct a fair trial in a charged climate.

“The fact that the Supreme Court has now been involved gives (the memo matter) extra importance and legitimacy,” said Shujaa Nawaz, a Pakistan scholar with the Atlantic Council.

Pakistan’s top court is now moving ahead with the petition, filed by Nawaz Sharif, Zardari’s chief opponent, raising questions about the political motivations for the case.

Bruce Riedel, a former CIA and White House official who chaired President Barack Obama’s 2009 review of US policy on the region, said Sharif himself initiated a similar petition over a decade ago.

He recalled a 1999 meeting with Sharif’s brother Shahbaz, who he said traveled to Washington to warn of what civilian officials at the time feared was a brewing military coup.

“It was an entire day spent at the Willard Hotel listening to Shahbaz talk about their fears that a military coup was coming and asking for American help to prevent it,” he said.

“That’s pretty much the charge (that) is being leveled against Ambassador Haqqani.”

A coup did ultimately happen, in 1999, bringing General Pervez Musharraf to power until he resigned as president in August 2008.

Courtesy: DAWN.COM

http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/22/memo-crisis-adds-pressure-to-us-ties.html